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Teachers' Religious Garb as an Instrument
for Globalization in Education
CAITLIN

S. KERR*

ABSTRACT

Nebraska and Pennsylvania currently have laws in place that
prohibit public school teachers from wearing religious garb. This Note
applies the appropriateconstitutional framework-a balancing test-in
order to determine the propriety of a religious garb statute. Courts have
upheld the statutes in light of perceived government endorsement of
teachers' religion and feared impact on impressionableyoung children.
However, both of these concerns are exaggerated and misplaced. Rather,
a court must consider the demands a newly globalized world places on
effective education for tomorrow'sglobal citizens.
INTRODUCTION

France recently caused a controversy by prohibiting students from
wearing "conspicuous"i religious garb in the public schools. Although
2
the initiative officially claims to maintain religious neutrality, the
French Prime Minister once suggested that the policy also seeks to
"contain the spread of Muslim fundamentalism."3 While the United

* Editor-in-Chief, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D. Candidate, 2011,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2008, Valparaiso University. I would like
to thank Professor Jayanth Krishnan for his thoughtful guidance throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank Noah Schroeder for his unfailing support.

1. See generally Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to
War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 343-44, 360 (2006)
(citing the French statute and providing an English translation).

2. See Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibitionof Muslim Headscarves from French Public
Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L. J. 251, 251-54 (2006). For a tentative defense of the French statute, see Steven

G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French Approach to
Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2005).
3. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, FranceBans Head Scarves in School, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3,
2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/02/world/main597565.shtml.
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States has criticized the policy's implementation, 4 it is surprising to note
that Nebraska and Pennsylvania (and until recently, Oregon)5 have
laws that similarly restrict teachers' wearing of religious garb;6
however, these laws receive little national press. This Note analyzes the
constitutionality and desirability of these states' religious garb statutes
in light of the current international controversy surrounding the issue.
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania and Nebraska statutes prohibiting
religious garb should be repealed. As a form of religious exercise
intersecting with free speech, the wearing of religious garb in public
schools is subject to the balancing test first set out in Pickeringv. Board
of Education7 In conducting this balancing test, courts support religious
garb statutes by asserting not only the government's interest in
maintaining separation between church and state, but also its interest
in protecting students from the supposed influence of teachers and from
perceived government sponsorship of religion. However, these threats
appear hollow in light of their constitutional implications. Namely, a
statute prohibiting religious garb may violate the Establishment
Clause. Yet, even if a religious garb statute withstands Establishment
Clause scrutiny, the demands of globalization add weight to the
argument that these statutes should be repealed. Globalization requires
educating our youth to be culturally knowledgeable, tolerant, and savvy
citizens in a global world.
Part I of this Note will examine the protections afforded by the First
Amendment. Specifically, courts use a strict scrutiny standard when
determining the constitutionality of a statute restricting religious
exercise. In the context of government employment, however, the
government may regulate religious exercise as a form of speech, if its
4. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ANN. REP. 52-54,
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/PDFs/annualreport2004may.pdf
at
available
("[TIhough increased immigration in France in recent years has created new challenges
for the French government, including integration of these immigrants into French society
as well as problems of public order, these challenges should be addressed directly, and not
by inappropriately limiting the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and
belief.").

5. See William McCall, Classroom Controversy: Oregon Teachers Restricted in What
They Can Wear Due to Law Originally Enacted for KKK, MISSOULIAN, Sept. 5, 2009,
http://missoulian.com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/religion/article-d76385ce-9988-1 1deb807-001cc4cO02e0.html; Tracy Russo, Fulfilling the Promise, U.S. DEP'T JUST. BLOG (May
20, 2010), http:/Iblogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/805.
6. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-898 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.650 (West
2010) (repealed 2010); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-1112 (West 2010).
7. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("The problem in any case is
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
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regulation passes the balancing test set forth in Pickering. Part II will
explore the justifications for such statutes in an effort to determine the
appropriate balance in favor of, or against, religious garb statutes. In
addition to the need for church-state separation, this analysis will
ultimately yield two prominent concerns: fear of creating the
appearance of government sponsorship of religion and fear of
inappropriate influence on students' religious choice. Part III will
establish the highly speculative nature of these interests. Accordingly,
Part IV will examine the other side of the balance-constitutional
safeguards for the free exercise of religion-in two parts. First, Part IV
will examine whether a religious garb statute would violate the
Establishment Clause. Second, Part IV will examine the weight
globalization adds in favor of religious garb. Part V will weigh the
interests of Part III and Part IV, and after balancing pro-restriction
justifications against the new countervailing concerns globalization
demands of education, I conclude that statutes prohibiting public school
teachers from wearing religious garb, even if constitutional, should be
repealed.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."8 The Framers believed that government and religion operated
9
best when state functions were separated from church functions. As a
result, the First Amendment provides two opposing dictates by which
the government must abide. First, the government may not establish a
religion by creating, formally sanctioning, or preferring any religion,
including preferring one religious sect over another, preferring religion
over nonreligion, or preferring nonreligion over religion. At the same
time, the government must not prohibit the free exercise of religion by
infringing on individuals' rights to order their lifestyles and conduct
according to the proscriptions of any, or no, religion.
In application, these two clauses more often conflict than
complement one another, for "it becomes apparent that some
accommodations of religion that facilitate its free exercise may offend
the prohibition against governmental establishments of religion, and
that some measures taken to prevent prohibited establishments might
offend the guarantee of free exercise of religion."10 As a result, the
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIvAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1248 (16th
ed. 2007).
10. Calvin Massey, The PoliticalMarketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
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Supreme Court has developed tests to determine whether legislation
violates the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause." The
issue of religious garb in the public school classroom demonstrates the
complexity of this conflict. Religious garb triggers not only teachers' free
exercise rights, which will be discussed below, but also potentially
implicates the prohibition on religious establishment by the
government, which will be discussed in Parts III and IV.
The Free Exercise Clause requires that laws targeting or impacting
religious exercise satisfy certain requirements. It subjects laws that
facially target religion to the strictest scrutiny because these statutes
place a discriminatory burden on the fundamental right of religious free
exercise. 12 Strict scrutiny means that a law must be in furtherance of a
compelling interest and must achieve this interest by narrowly tailored
means. 13 At the state level, laws that apply widely to a broad range of
conduct but that impact religious exercise are not subject to strict
scrutiny14 unless the state's courts construe the state's constitution to
protect free religious exercise from nondiscriminatory laws, or the state
legislature enacts a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).15 If a
state enacts a RFRA, such laws of general applicability that impact
religion are also subject to strict scrutiny.
Although the Constitution specifically identifies freedom of religious
exercise in a separate clause, free exercise rights, as a form of
expression, often overlap with broader free speech issues. This overlap
demonstrates the nature and extent of rights and restrictions in the
public school system. The public education system operates as a
department of the government, and public schools must abide by
constitutional limits. Although public school students and teachers

11. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993).
13. See id. at 531-32.
14. See Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-885 (1990).
15. The federal RFRA sought to restore strict scrutiny to generally applicable laws
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause in the face of Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb (2006). The RFRA was held unconstitutional as applied to the states, see City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), but many states have since enacted state law
versions that are substantially similar to the original RFRA. For a list and discussion of
state RFRAs, see Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRA's 473-79 & n.67 (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id=1666268.
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retain their constitutional rights while they are at school,16 their rights
have been restricted in light of the unique educating and socializing
goals of the school, and the special relationship of the government with
its employees.
With respect to speech, public schools may regulate speech when it
would be impermissible for the government to do so were the speech to
occur in the public sphere.17 This regulation occurs in light of schools'
particular purposes-educating students and teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.' 8 A student's exercise of
free speech that "materially and substantially interfere[s]" with a
school's educating and socializing mission can be proscribed.19 A school
is also free to disassociate itself from certain inappropriate conduct that
would be protected in the public sphere by punishing that conduct in
order to send a message that certain behavior is socially unacceptable. 20
Therefore, while students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate,"21 they may experience restricted freedom of
expression. Just as schools may regulate speech, students' religious free
exercise rights may be permitted and prohibited in light of the school's
special mission.
Teachers' free speech rights may also be restricted, albeit under a
line of cases regarding government employees. Government employees
retain their constitutional rights as citizens. Accordingly, public officials
may not regulate employees' speech "as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest in connection with the operation of [their workplace]" 22
because such political speech lies at the core of the First Amendment.
However, a citizen entering governmental service as a public employee
"must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." 23 As a result,
when an employee's speech "disrupts the efficiency of the public services
[the government] performs through its employees,"24 the government
enjoys "wide latitude in managing [its] offices" 25 and can restrict
16. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
17. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007).
18. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986); Tinker, 393
U.S. at 509 (discussing a public school's authority to regulate speech in order to prevent
disturbances in the classroom).
19. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
20. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682-83.
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
22. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
23. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
24. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
25. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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employees' speech. 26 In determining the outer limits of the latitude
afforded the government in this context, a court must balance the
citizen's interest in speaking against the government agency's interest
in providing public services. 27 Yet, in cases in which employees' speech
relates to a matter of "private concern," such as employee grievances, 28
employment restrictions on speech are not scrutinized and are
presumed constitutional.
Returning to religious exercise, United States Supreme Court
"precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a
First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech
Clause as secular private expression." 29 Secular expression by a citizen
on matters of public concern often sounds in political tones. Political
speech lies at the core of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, and regulations of core political speech must pass strict
scrutiny.30 Likewise, the Supreme Court once described religious
expression as so integral to the Free Speech Clause that neglect of
religious expression was akin to producing "Hamlet without the
prince."3 ' In addition, the separate religion clauses in the Constitution
emphasize the importance of religious exercise. Yet, in the context of
government employment, courts subject political speech to a balancing
test. Viewing religious exercise through this free speech lens, religious
garb is afforded the same level of protection as political speech by
government employees: a balancing test.
The Supreme Court first outlined the balancing test applied to
political speech, or speech on other "matters of public concern," in
Pickering.32 In that case, a school administration discharged a teacher
in retaliation for comments the teacher made about the administration's
handling of bond proposals and use of other financial resources. In
analyzing the issue, the Court applied a test that endeavors to "arrive at
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees."33 One side of the scale focuses on
both the individual's and society's interest in the offending speech. The

26. See, e.g., id. (describing discharge from employment for certain types of speech as
an acceptable form of restriction).
27. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
28. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
29. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
30. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626-27 & n.3 (1976).
31. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 760.
32. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
33. Id.
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opposite side of the scale focuses on the effect of the conduct on effective
administration and achievement of workplace goals.
The balance tips in favor of the government when the individual's
speech interferes with the completion of the individual's duties or the
duties of other co-workers. In Pickering, the teacher expressed his views
at a school board meeting. In ultimately protecting the teacher's speech,
the Court noted that his speech "neither [was] shown nor can be
presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered
with the regular operation of the schools generally," in part because the
teacher criticized distant school board administrators. 34 By contrast, in
Connick v. Myers, an assistant prosecutor used an internal office
questionnaire to criticize her immediate supervisors and their
application of personnel rules. Although a portion of the discharged
prosecutor's speech involved a matter of public concern, the Court held
that the speech did not tip the balance in favor of protection. The Court
explained that the prosecutor's questionnaire stirred up a possible
"mini-insurrection" among her co-workers. 35 Thus, when an individual's
speech interferes with performance of workplace duties, or with others'
performance of their duties, the individual's speech, albeit on a matter
of public concern, is permissibly restricted.
The balance tips in favor of protecting the individual's speech when
not only the individual has an interest in his speech, but also when
society has a distinct interest in the individual's speech. The Supreme
Court later explained that when a teacher comments on the school
administration's use of public funds, society has a marked interest in
the teacher's speech.3 6 Society has an interest in "receiving the well37
informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion,"
for these government employees are often particularly and uniquely
well informed. As a result, the balance must also give way to society's
interest in the individual's speech.
Unlike the speech in Pickeringand Connick, teachers' religious garb
does not usually involve criticism of one's workplace or superiors, nor
does it involve comment on civic debate by an individual necessarily
well informed on the issue. Yet, teachers' religious garb may still
disrupt the workplace, while possibly offering greater societal value.
The next section analyzes those concerns, including whether teachers'
religious garb interferes with the achievement of schools' educating and

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 572-73.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983).
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419-21 (2006).
Id. at 419.
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socializing functions and whether society has a specific vested interest
in a teachers' religious expression.
II. TEACHERS' RIGHT TO WEAR RELIGIOUS GARB IN NEBRASKA AND
PENNSYLVANIA

As the student body has evolved into a more religiously diverse
entity, the Constitution's religion clauses have become an important
source of rights. Now more than ever, school officials must steer a
careful course between the prohibition of the Establishment Clause and
the command of the Free Exercise Clause, all while exercising their
rights as governmental employers within constitutional limits.
Likewise, in analyzing challenges to speech-restrictive policies or
statutes, courts must balance teachers' freedom of religious exercise
against three potentially weighty interests: the state's interest in
maintaining proper church-state separation and the more specific
interests in protecting students and avoiding the appearance of
entanglement.
A. Teachers'Religious Garb and the Establishment Clause
A heavy weight is placed on the scale if religious garb statutes are
necessary to maintain the requisite church-state separation, lest public
schools violate the Establishment Clause. If the wearing of religious
garb by a teacher violates the Establishment Clause, then a law
prohibiting such dress serves as an implementing regulation of a
constitutional prohibition. Yet, if the wearing of religious garb by a
teacher does not violate the Establishment Clause, then this interest
impresses far less weight on the scale.
Importantly, the Oregon and Pennsylvania state courts provided
one answer to the Establishment Clause question by illuminating their
conception of the relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause as applied to teachers' religious garb.38 According
to these courts, the Free Exercise Clause does not end where the
Establishment Clause begins. Rather, a gap exists between the end of
the Free Exercise Clause and the beginning of the Establishment
Clause wherein a state may make policy decisions about how it will
regulate its public school teachers.

38. Because these state court decisions have interpreted the issue, the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence will not be more fully analyzed here. For discussion of Supreme
Court precedent on the issue, see infra Part IV.
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This idea was implicitly approved in an early religious garb case,
Hysong v. School District of Gallitzin Borough.3 9 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania declined to hold that public school instruction by nuns
dressed in their religious garb constituted sectarian teaching as
prohibited by law. 4 0 However, the court also noted, "the legislature may,
by statute, enact that all teachers shall wear in the school room a
particular style of dress, and that none other shall be worn."41 The court
signified that although religiously garbed teachers' instruction did not
constitute an impermissible establishment of religion, it was not
protected as the free exercise of religion. 42 The legislature was thus free
to determine whether it would regulate religious garb.
The Oregon case Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J confirmed
this conception nearly one hundred years after Pennsylvania's Hysong
decision. 43 The Cooper court illuminated the gap identified in Hysong by
explaining that it required lawmakers to make a "policy choice." 44 The
Cooper court explained the decisions of other courts in similar cases
(including Pennsylvania's Hysong decision) before holding that
generally "more than a teacher's religious dress is needed to show a
forbidden sectarian influence in the classroom." 45 The court thus
maintained the "gap" between the clauses and upheld the law based on
the Oregon legislature's policy justifications.
While Hysong and Cooper clearly distinguished the limits of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, state courts have
yet to comment further on the Free Exercise issue. Rather, in 2003, a
federal court applying Pennsylvania law simply reiterated that "merely
employing an individual . . . who unobstrusively [sic] displays her

religious adherence is not tantamount to government endorsement of
that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or coercion." 46 In so
doing, this court reaffirmed that the wearing of religious garb was not
an Establishment Clause violation.
39. Hysong, v. Sch. Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 30 A. 482 (Pa. 1894).
40. Id. at 484.
41. Id.
42. Id. This is not a concept unique to teachers' wearing of religious garb. In Locke v.
Davey, Justice Rehnquist indicated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause are frequently in tension, but '"there is room for play in the joints' between them.
In other words, there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause." Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004)
(citation omitted).
43. Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986). This case was cited

with approval by United States v. Board of Education for the School District of
Philadelphia,911 F.2d 882, 888 (3rd Cir. 1990).
44. 723 P.2d at 308.

45. Id.
46. Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 554 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
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B. Policy Regulation of Teachers'Religious Garb

I

Although the Oregon and Pennsylvania courts held that the wearing
of religious garb by a teacher is not an Establishment Clause violation,
the courts nevertheless allowed regulation of religious garb. The
primary policy justification cited by these courts is that teachers'
religious garb is capable of interfering with the public schools' educating
and socializing functions, a reason that provides significant justification
for allowing restrictions. While these cases come from only two states,
the language and themes employed are broad enough that they could be
used to justify any number of laws infringing on teachers' freedom of
speech or free exercise rights. The courts' descriptions of the policy
considerations and choices made by state legislatures are thus
instructive for future legal challenges to this or a similar law.
Courts most commonly employ two complementary justifications for
restriction: avoiding the impression of government sponsorship of
religion and avoiding coercion of impressionable students. Even though
religious garb has been held not to violate the Establishment Clause,
states seek to avoid the impression that the government, as the
teachers' employer, endorses the teachers' religion. 47 An impression of
government endorsement is problematic because the audience consists
of young children and teenagers who may be unable to separate the
teachers' relationship with the government-employer from the teachers'
private religious beliefs. If students are as impressionable as is feared,
and they perceive government endorsement of religious beliefs, then
they may feel pressure to conform their own beliefs to those of their
teachers.
Concern regarding teachers' influence arises regardless of whether a
child is sophisticated enough to perceive a relationship between the
government, schools, and teachers. Elementary, middle, and high school
students are uniquely situated as a "captive" audience 48 due to
mandatory school attendance laws. Furthermore, teachers exert an
47. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 899 ("Accommodating Ms. Reardon by
permitting her to wear her religious garb while she is teaching conveys to her students
that the state favors or prefers religion over nonreligion."); EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F.
Supp. 1150, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The proscription on religious garb is intended to
prevent any appearance of State sponsored religion .... ); Cooper, 723 P.2d at 313 ('Their
concern is that the teacher's appearance in religious garb may leave a conscious or
unconscious impression among young people and their parents that the school endorses
the particular religious commitment of the person whom it has assigned the public role of
teacher. This is what makes the otherwise privileged display of a teacher's religious
commitment by her dress incompatible with the atmosphere of religious neutrality that
[Oregon state law] aims to preserve, or so the school authorities may decide.").
48. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 899.
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intense influence over children because teachers spend a great deal of
time with students during their formative years, years during which
students are particularly susceptible to perceived differences and peer
pressure.4 9
For these reasons, legislatures and courts worry that teachers who
appear daily in religious garb in front of their students will
unintentionally exert pressure on students to conform to teachers'
religious beliefs.50 This pressure will only increase if students perceive
that the school as a whole supports the teachers' religion. 5 '
Furthermore, this pressure will infringe on the students' absolute right
to freedom of religious belief52 because "students might see a teacher
wearing religious clothing, and understand that this expression of faith
as a statement concerning what beliefs they too should hold."5 3 By
regulating teachers' garb, legislatures seek to protect students from
what they perceive as subtle pressure to convert and conform. However,
whether this pressure indeed exists, and whether it could or does
interfere with schools' educating and socializing function, has yet to be
thoroughly tested or firmly established.

49. See, e.g., id. ("In the classroom environment, it cannot be gainsaid that a teacher is
a powerful influence on children, particularly, as here, young children (elementary-school
age).").
50. It may be that the higher the frequency of appearance in religious garb, the greater
the risk of pressure to conform. See, e.g., Cooper, 723 P.2d at 313 ('The statute therefore
would not be violated whenever a teacher makes an occasional appearance in religious
dress, for instance on her way to or from a seasonal ceremony. It is the same distinction as
that between an occasional religious meeting, parade or brief display in a public park or
building and the permanent erection of a religious symbol . . . . Only wearing religious
dress as a regular or frequently repeated practice while teaching is grounds for
disqualification.").
51. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 899 ("It is a short leap in logic from these
facts to conclude that children could, in exercise of their curiosity, think that a school is
favoring religion per se to the detriment of nonreligion by permitting [a teacher] to wear
her religious apparel.").
52. See, e.g., Cooper, 723 P.2d at 309 ("Nonetheless, the aim of maintaining the
religious neutrality of the public schools furthers a constitutional obligation beyond an
ordinary policy preference of the legislature. It is the obligation stated in [Oregon
Constitution] Article VIII, section 3, to provide for 'a uniform, and general system of
Common Schools,' which must be done without imposing on the religious freedom under
Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the children who attend those schools.").
53. EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (explaining further
that "[i]f, however, the clothing is worn for religious reasons but is unlikely to convey a
message concerning religious affiliation or belief to students, the risk is not present and
the prohibition is unnecessary").
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III. QUESTIONABLE WEIGHT OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTING
RELIGIOUS GARB

The Pennsylvania and Oregon courts argued that the air of
government sponsorship and the possible impact on children justified a
policy regulating the religious garb of teachers. It appears these
justifications continue to be used in the present day, as Oregon recently
passed an amendment to its religious garb statute that exempted all
school employees except teachers from the prohibition. 54 However,
Oregon later removed the exception 55 after a warning from the U.S.
Department of Justice that the law likely violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.56 Despite these states' concerns, the actual degree to
which these concerns materialize is far more speculative than the
legislatures and courts indicate.
A. Teachers'Influenceon Students

The theory that schools and teachers influence children socially is
widely recognized and generally accepted. Scholars and the U.S.
Supreme Court agree that schools and teachers provide much more than
academic instruction. "In some ways, [public education] is a microcosm
of the larger society" that aids in the acquisition of "skills necessary to
the functioning of a healthy democratic republic."57 The Court has
recognized that "schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order" and teachers serve as "role models" of these
values.58 This theory-that schools and teachers not only nurture
students to intellectual development, but also inspire values that society
deems beneficial-supports the concerns of the courts outlined in Part
II.
In spite of this widely accepted theory, the actual degree to which
teachers shape children's intellectual, social, cultural, and religious
development is uncertain. While studies document that teachers'
characteristics influence children's academic success, research on
teachers' non-academic influence is scarce. Before lawmakers and courts
can determine ultimately whether to allow teachers to wear religious
54. See McCall, supra note 5.
55. Press Release, House Speaker's Office, Or. State Legislature, Governor Signs
Repeal of Ban on Religious Dress (April 1, 2010), http://www.leg.state.or.us/pressreleases/hunt 040110.pdf.
56. Russo, supra note 5.

57. William Lester, Student Religious Expression Within Public Schools, in 2 CHURCHSTATE ISSUES IN AMERICA TODAY 73, 98 (Ann W. Duncan & Steven L. Jones eds., 2008).
58. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
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garb in the classroom, they must know whether this clothing will
interfere with, encourage, or have no effect on the educating and
socializing functions of the public school system.
By way of example, a recent study suggests that students might not
identify teachers as role models.5 9 Nearly 400 English school children
aged ten to twelve and fourteen to sixteen were asked to list their role
models-only 2.4% listed a teacher.60 Teachers ranked sixth on young
girls' lists of role models and ninth on young boys' lists.61 In contrast,
close relatives topped both lists.6 2 This result suggests that additional
guidance from parents and close relatives could overcome any possible
influence by teachers. As the authors admit, there are some limits to the
study.63 The students provided the rankings themselves, and, while
students may not self-identify teachers as role models, subconsciously
they might perceive teachers as role models.
In a related inquiry, the German Federal Constitution Court noted,
"none of the experts [who testified at a hearing] had found that exposing
children to a headscarf would lead to religious conversion."6 4 While more
research needs to be done, it appears that teachers may not have as
much influence as expected. With only assumptions to support the
assertion that teachers' religious garb influences students, but not much
research to disprove it, society's interest in protecting children from
teachers' religious influence is unclear. With no evidence on one side of
the scale, and scant evidence on the other, the courts' speculation adds
little weight to the scale in favor of regulating teachers' religious garb.

B. Government Sponsorship of Religion
Courts are also concerned about a guise of government sponsorship
of religion when teachers wear religious garb. If students are aware of
65
the interrelationship of teachers, public schools, and the government,

59. Patricia Bricheno & Mary Thornton, Role Model, Hero or Champion? Children's
Views Concerning Role Models, 49 EDUC. RES. 383, 385, 393-94 (2007) (defining a role
model as "namely a person you respect, follow, look up to or want to be like").
60. Id. at 386-87, 392.
61. Id. at 390.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 394 (speculating that teachers may have fared better "if children were asked
who they 'looked up to' and 'respected' rather than possibly just focusing on [alternative
prompts such as] 'want to be like' and 'follow').

64. Robert A. Kahn, The Headscarfas Threat:A Comparison of German and U.S. Legal
Discourses,40 VAND. J. TRASNAT'L L. 417, 427 (2007).
65. See also Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 553 (W.D. Pa.
2003) (emphasis omitted) (discussing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
118, 121 (2001)), in which the Supreme Court "explained that any danger that elementary
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then the concern about an underlying message of sponsorship must be
balanced against the converse message of hostility if teachers are
precluded from wearing religious garb. The sponsorship-hostility
argument is reflected in a pluralism-secularism dichotomy that is not
new to constitutional interpretation and theory. Constitutional scholar
Michael McConnell articulated one of many arguments on the topic
when he argued for pluralism, 66 an argument which undermines the
government sponsorship concern.
After reviewing what he characterizes as the errors of religion
clause jurisprudence under the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts,
McConnell argues for a pluralistic interpretation of the religion
clauses.6 7 The clauses should be seen as guaranteeing "a pluralistic
republic in which citizens are free to exercise their religious differences
without hindrance from the state .

.

. whether that hindrance is for or

against religion."6 8 Pluralism is the best form of church-state
relationship because true neutrality is an "unattainable idea," for when
"the government communicates to the people it will favor some ideas
and oppose others," for its speech automatically loses its neutrality.6 9
But if the government tries to attain neutrality by not speaking about
religion, this relegates religion to the private sphere, and, in effect,
creates a secular culture that is hostile to religion. 70 Without further
research, the argument that a religious garb statute fosters religious
hostility nullifies the argument that religious garb creates the
appearance of governmental support. As a result, this interest adds only
a slight weight to the scale.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION AND GLOBALIZATION IN
EDUCATION

At least three interests exist in support of teachers wearing
religious garb. First, teachers (and the citizenry at large) have a strong
and protected interest in religious expression. Yet in the case of
school children would misperceive an endorsement of religion (if the school were to permit
religious organizations to use its public forums to deliver religious based messages) would
be no greater than the danger that they might perceive a hostility toward religion (if the
school permitted other community organizations with secular messages to use the forum
but prohibited those with religious affiliations)."
66. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
168 (1992). For a rebuttal of McConnell's argument, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion
and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1992).
67. McConnell, supra note 66, at 168.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 188.
70. See id. at 190.

TEACHERS' RELIGIOUS GARB AS AN INSTRUMENT

553

government employment, these interests are permissibly abridged
under certain circumstances. As a result, the focus of this section will be
on the remaining two interests. Second, a statute restricting religious
garb may violate the Establishment Clause because it may inhibit
religious exercise. If so, a heavy weight is added to the scale in favor of
allowing religious garb in classrooms and repealing religious garb
statutes. Third, religious garb may be an instrument of globalization in
the public schools, fostering tolerant and culturally savvy global
citizens.
In 2003, a Pennsylvania federal court suggested that religious garb
statutes might not pass constitutional muster.71 The court struck down
a governmental agency's religious garb prohibition that aligned with the
state's religious garb statute, and noted that "[i]n the current legal
landscape of the Establishment Clause, it is unlikely that the Garb
Statute would withstand the heightened scrutiny and endorsement
analysis to which it now must be subjected." 72 Under current U.S.
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a "statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; . . . its principal or primary effect

must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."'73 Justice O'Connor conceptualized the Establishment Clause
inquiry as an "endorsement test"--one "asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion" and "whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review
in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval." 74
In theory, the Establishment Clause prevents the advancement,
inhibition, endorsement, or disapproval of religion; it applies equally to
statutes creating an establishment of religion as to statutes prohibiting
certain religious practices. In reality, cases dealing with prohibited
religious expression are more practically analyzed under the Free
Exercise Clause.75 However, when the Supreme Court analyzed a

71. See Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 555 (W.D. Pa.

2003).
72. Id.
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
74. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
(explaining that Establishment Clause challenges "for the most part have addressed
governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions," whereas, when statutes
disfavor religion, "the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive"). For a case currently working
its way through the 9th Circuit that could possibly reach the Supreme Court, see Catholic

League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.
2009), reh'ggranted, 586 F.3d 1166 (2009) (posing an Establishment Clause challenge to a
city resolution expressing disapproval of Catholic adoption policies).
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statute purporting to disapprove of religion under the Establishment
Clause, the Court indicated that, barring religious animus,76 there is
sufficient "play in the joints" 77 between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause such that the states may enforce wider churchstate separation than the Establishment Clause requires. Locke v.
Davey involved such a challenge. A Washington state scholarship
program was challenged under the Establishment Clause because it
precluded its recipients from pursuing a degree in theology. In
upholding the constitutionality of the program, however, the Court
found no religious animus, and it further indicated that the state's
desire to avoid funding a religious degree fell well within the "room"78
between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
A statute barring religious garb in the classroom also likely falls
within this gap. The purpose of these statutes, as shown by current
court interpretations, is to prevent students from feeling subtle pressure
to conform to their teachers' religious beliefs, and to avoid the air of
government sponsorship of teachers' religion.79 However, the law
certainly inhibits religious expression in that teachers are not permitted
to wear silent indicators of their faith. In addition, the law could require
government entanglement in religion if school administrators were
required to assess whether a teacher's outfit involved a personal style
choice or a religiously mandated piece of clothing.80 At first glance, then,
it would appear that a religious garb statute could violate the
Establishment Clause.
In spite of these possibilities, the Oregon state court again indicated
that, just as teachers' religious garb would not violate the
Establishment Clause, neither would a statute prohibiting religious
garb. In upholding such a statute, the court opined, "a rule against such
religious dress is permissible to avoid the appearance of sectarian
influence, favoritism, or official approval in the public school." 81 This
interpretation, combined with the Supreme Court's conception of the

76. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
77. Id. at 718-19 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
78. Id. at 725.
79. The legislative history, however, speaks to a purpose more akin to the religious
animus of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Originally
proposed and supported by the Ku Klux Klan, these statutes sought to prevent nuns from
teaching in the public schools. Later support of the law focused on protecting
"impressionable schoolchildren." McCall, supra note 5.
80. See, e.g., EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (avoiding
inquiry into religious prescriptions by determining whether garb is religious by what
objective observers would conclude about whether the wearer's dress is religiously
motivated).
81. Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 308 (Or. 1986).
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"play in the joints" between the two clauses, suggests that a religious
garb statute would pass constitutional muster.
In the event that a religious garb statute is constitutionally
permissible, the interest in avoiding a constitutional violation weighs
light on the balance. However, globalization adds an additional weight
to the scale; it requires that today's students be educated in light of
their futures as global citizens in a diverse world.
As a result of the increased migration of peoples, ideas, and goods
characterizing globalization, "[e]ducators around the world are faced
with new challenges of balancing local, national, and global norms and
values in the process of educating children." 82 As the educational
landscape changes, a new goal arises: education must socialize "children
for their futures in global society."83 Harvard Professor of International
Education Fernando Reimers recently articulated that globalization
requires students to gain "'global competency'-the knowledge and skills
that help them cross disciplinary domains to comprehend global events
and respond to them effectively."8 Global competency certainly requires
proficiency in a range of academic disciplines, but it also requires
proficiency in relationships. In order to be successful global citizens,
children must develop knowledge of and appreciation for the cultural,
religious, and ethnic diversity that globalization brings.
Tomorrow's global citizens need these skills because they will
interact with a diverse group of people on a daily basis. In conducting
their everyday affairs, they must be able to navigate the unique values
and lifestyles espoused by their contemporaries. As a result, Reimers
mentions one important dimension of this competency: "a positive
approach toward cultural differences and a willingness to engage those
differences. That requires empathy with people with other cultural
identities, an interest and understanding of various civilizations and
their histories, and the ability to see those differences as opportunities
85
While
for constructive, respectful, and peaceful transactions."
individual teachers may not acutely influence students, the educational
environment as a whole is likely to impact many facets of a child's
development. As the educational process prepares students for success
in society, it must take account of a globalized society and prepare
students for the interactions they will experience.

82.
LEGAL
83.
84.

Margaret Sutton, The Globalization of MulticulturalEducation, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL
STUD. 97, 107 (2005).
Id.
Fernando Reimers, Global Competency is Imperative for Global Success, CHRON.

HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 2009, at A29, available at http://chronicle.com/article/GlobalCompetency-Is/9742.
85. Id.

556

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1

The educational environment, then, will best prepare students by
providing them an accurate picture of the greater society as a whole.
Religion plays a part in this society, and thus an educational process
"dialogue that excludes religious expression from its environment would
miss important parts of our society."86 When teachers (and students)
appear in religious garb in the classroom, this provides an early
opportunity to accustom students to human differences and develop a
positive approach to these differences. The exclusion of religion hinders
the ability of students to navigate the global world. As a result, this
concern weighs heavily on the balance in favor of religious garb.
V. TIPPING THE BALANCE: GLOBALIZATION IN EDUCATION

In an age of globalization and increased diversity, the justifications
for religious garb statutes will only gain more relevance to issues of
religious free exercise in schools. But regulation of teachers' religious
garb, as speech by public employees, is scrutinized under a balancing
test, and the justifications offered in favor of statutes must be weighed
against the countervailing interests of society. Ultimately, as
populations become more diverse, we must account for the demands
globalization places on the education of our youth.
Turning to the balancing test, the Establishment Clause concerns
on both sides have little weight. Religious garb in the public schools may
appear to be an Establishment Clause violation, but the Oregon and
Pennsylvania courts have demonstrated that it is not. Conversely, a
Pennsylvania court suggested that a religious garb statute might be an
Establishment Clause violation, but, given the leeway states are
permitted in achieving church-state separation, a religious garb statute
is unlikely to be a violation. With these interests effectively cancelled
out, the remaining interests determine whether religious garb should be
regulated; the perceived need to protect students must be balanced
against the demands of globalization. Three possible scenarios,
presented below, demonstrate the resultant balance.
In the first scenario, teachers are role models 87 for students and
students feel compelled to emulate their teachers. In this case, the
courts' fears are realized, and teachers' religious garb subtly causes
students to emulate their teachers, to question their own religion, or to
stigmatize students of other faiths as outsiders. Faced with such a

86. Lester, supra note 57, at 98.
87. Here, I employ the definition as used in the study discussed supra in Part III.
Bricheno & Thornton, supra note 59, at 393-94 (defining a role model as "namely a person
you respect, follow, look up to or want to be like").
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relationship, the balance tips in favor of regulating religious garb so as
to protect schools' educating and socializing functions.
In the second scenario, the impact of teachers on students is
attenuated, and teachers are seen as conduits of knowledge. If teachers
are seen neither as role models nor legitimate members of a child's
social circle, and are instead viewed by students merely as transferors of
information, teachers' religious garb has no effect at all. This scenario
suggests a decision in favor of teachers' religious rights: teachers
desiring to wear religious garb would be permitted to subtly adhere to
the tenets of their faith without interfering with the schools' educating
and socializing functions.
In the third scenario, teachers are not role models, but children see
them as legitimate members of their social circle. Under this theory,
teachers exert academic influence over their students, but are
nevertheless visible and respected members of the community.
Teachers' religious garb may familiarize students with diversity
symbols and educate students about diversity in a global world. In this
way, teachers' religious garb could serve the demands globalization
places on educators and lawmakers and further the schools' educating
and socializing goals. Such a policy would again provide those teachers
the opportunity to adhere to the tenets of their faith, and, at the same
time, aid in school children's acquisition of knowledge and social skills.
If teachers do not influence students, then the policy justification
that the restriction of religious garb furthers schools' educating and
socializing functions fails. Nevertheless, if teachers have influence by
way of their visibility and respectability as community members, a
counterargument emerges in favor of allowing teachers to wear religious
garb in the classroom, for religious garb, in fact, contributes to the
schools' educating and socializing functions. Even if teachers serve as
more than academic role models for students, additional research is
needed regarding the degree and manner in which this kind of influence
arises. At the present time, teachers' religious influence on students is
too speculative to tip the balance in favor of prohibiting teachers'
religious garb in the name of preserving the schools' educating and
socializing functions, especially in light of the countervailing
justification of globalization and education.
A preference for secularism, which arguably fosters religious
hostility,88 creates problems in an era of globalization when citizens of
different countries, including theocratic countries, interact on a daily
basis. Globalization requires exposure to positive experiences with

88. McConnell, supranote 66, at 190.
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others from different backgrounds during the educational years.89 If a
school were to prohibit religious garb, it would send a negative message
about one dimension of difference-religious difference-because
"attempting to create neutrality within the school walls may have the
opposite effect of highlighting the absence of that which the schools are
trying to equalize."9 0 In contrast, McConnell's pluralism ideal fosters a
"broadly inclusive public sphere, in which the public is presented a wide
variety of perspectives, religious ones included."9' This inclusive public
sphere, in conjunction with positive experiences with diversity through
teachers' religious garb, should be implemented in schools because it
will best attain the goals of global education.
Long considered an instrument of socialization, the educational
system provides a unique opportunity to foster the skill of tolerant
navigation of a globalized world. Indeed, this is not a new
phenomenon-the steps the U.S. civil rights movement took toward
racial tolerance were achieved in part through integration of public
schools. 92 Now, education needs to be brought into the globalization era
by teaching students about other dimensions of difference in addition to
race, for students must also appreciate cultural, religious, ethnic, and
national diversity. 93 In this way, our youth will acquire an
understanding and appreciation for difference that will aid them as
adults in the globalized world. Continued repetition of abstract
conventional "wisdom," such as the interests articulated in Part III, will
impede achievement of this goal.

89. See Sutton, supra note 82, at 107 ("While fostering a sense of citizenship remains
an important function of mass schooling, it is becoming less and less viable to do so at the
expense of socializing children for their futures in a global society.").
90. Dianne Gereluk, Children'sAutonomy and Symbolic Clothing in Schools: Help or
Hindrance? in PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

198, 201

(Yvonne Raley & Gerhard Preyer eds., 2010).
91. McConnell, supra note 66 at 193.
92. Integrated public schooling validated the identities of socially oppressed groups,
and prevented the proliferation of racial animus against the "other" by forcing students, at
a very young age, to confront difference. See Brown v. Bd of Edue., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94
(1956) (explaining that public school "is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment" and, as a result, "to separate [students] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone"). For a discussion of the role of the civil rights movement
in encouraging multicultural education, see Sutton, supra note 82, at 97-98.
93. See also id. (describing how globalization has complicated the meaning of cultural
identity and how school systems are changing, or need to change, to cope with the new
universal diversity).
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Although McConnell's argument is forceful in the global education
context, additional research and discussion is needed before one can
wholeheartedly apply McConnell's approach to education. In particular,
more information is needed as to the degree of influence teachers truly
have on students. This inquiry must focus both on teachers' influence
and the correlation of influence with students' ages. It may be that peer
groups become more important than teachers to students during their
high school years, but that teachers take a more central role in the lives
of younger students. If authorities allow teachers' religious garb, they
must decide whether it will be allowed at all grade levels or only at
higher grade levels.
Authorities must also decide if there will be some limit to the kind
and size of religious garb. 94 They must decide whether to consider the
perspective of others regarding clothing as religious exercise.95 For
example, in the context of Muslim headscarves, some have suggested
that the headscarf is about suppression of women, suppression of
women's sexuality, or proselytization.9 6 Authorities also must address
how teachers should explain the garb when questioned by students.
Some teachers have offered to describe the garb as a personal choice,97
but in light of McConnell's argument, it seems that such a response
supports an air of hostility toward, or embarrassment about, religion.
These and other preliminary considerations must be addressed if the
educational system is to fulfill its aspirations of educating students and
preparing them for effective lives in the global world.

94. See, e.g., Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552-54 (W.D.
Pa. 2003) ("As this history demonstrates, the chances of disruption, distraction, or
confusion over jewelry, albeit one expressing a religious viewpoint, are slim to none-it
hasn't happened and is not likely to. .. . Given the inconspicuous nature of plaintiffs
expression of her religious beliefs by wearing a small cross on a necklace, and the fact that
other jewelry with secular messages or no messages is permitted to be worn at school, it is
extremely unlikely that even elementary students would perceive Penns Manor or ARIN
to be endorsing her otherwise unvoiced Christian viewpoint, and defendants certainly
presented no evidence to support such a perception. Merely employing an individual, such
as plaintiff, who unobtrusively displays her religious adherence is not tantamount to
government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or
coercion.").
95. See EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (determining
whether garb is religious by what objective observers would conclude about whether the
wearer's dress is religiously motivated).
96. For an extended discussion of these themes, see Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of

Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to
Wear the Muslim Headscarf,5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441 (2008).
97. E.g., Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 1153.
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CONCLUSION

France's recent policy prohibiting the wearing of "conspicuous"
religious symbols by students generated much criticism in the United
States,98 yet critics of the French law often overlook the concomitant
rights of teachers. Even in the United States, at least two states
prohibit teachers' wearing of religious garb. However, religious garb
should be permitted due to teachers' and society's strong interests in
freedom of religious expression.
As a form of speech akin to core political speech, religious exercise is
afforded the protection of the Pickering balancing test in the context of
government-employment. On one side of the balance exists the
government's interest in preserving church-state separation and
achieving its schools' educating and socializing functions, while the
other side consists of society's and teachers' interest in expressing
religious beliefs. Courts often justify the restriction of teachers' religious
expression in the name of school goals; therefore, this Note has focused
on the validity of these goals.
As an important preliminary step in the balance, the courts in
Pennsylvania and Oregon signaled that allowing a teacher to wear
religious garb does not violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, a
legislature is entitled to make a "policy choice" whether to allow
teachers' religious garb. In the context of religious garb statutes, the
driving forces for upholding these laws are the perceived ill effects on
schools' socializing and educating functions.
Courts and legislators worry that teachers in religious garb will
influence students to convert to the teachers' religion. They base this
fear on the belief that teachers serve as role models for students, but
there is no concrete scientific evidence to support this contention. In
fact, one study suggests that students may not look up to their teachers
after all. 99 Faced with such an ambiguous interest, the courts can hardly
find a threat substantial enough to justify the restriction of teachers'
religious free exercise rights.
Conventional wisdom has justified religious garb statutes by way of
the belief that teachers in religious garb signify government sponsorship
of religion. Yet, even if one believes that students will understand the
relationship between the government, schools, and teachers, it does not
follow that students will see their teachers' religious garb as
sponsorship by the government. Conversely, it is equally likely that, if
the government were to prohibit religious garb, students will see this
98. See Custos, supra note 1, at 340; Gey, supra note 2, at 8; Walterick, supra note 2, at
259.
99. Bricheno & Thornton, supranote 59, at 393-94.
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governmental intervention in the private affairs of their teachers as
governmental hostility to religion. As a result, this Note has shown that
both concerns may be exaggerated and misplaced.
More importantly, courts must not overlook the heavy interests on
the opposite side of the scale. It is unclear whether a statute prohibiting
religious garb would violate the Establishment Clause. Regardless,
teachers clearly have a valuable interest in expressing their religious
beliefs. Yet, there are also strong implications for effective globalfocused education when teachers are not allowed to wear religious garb.
Religious garb in the classroom should be permitted because this
type of attire does not interfere with schools' goals and in fact
contributes to the educational process. "Given the growing
interdependence among nations as a result of trade, increased
communications, and migratory flows, it will be crucial for people to
develop the skills to understand and help resolve [the resultant
significant global] challenges," 0 0 and the educational system is uniquely
positioned to offer these skills to the nation's youth. While increased
religious diversity is just one of many facets of globalization, tomorrow's
citizens must gain tolerance and knowledge of this diversity. By
allowing teachers to wear religious garb, the schools provide a safe
environment in which students may acclimate to this and other
dimensions of difference.
The hostility symbolized by governmental restriction of teachers'
religious garb may create a secular culture in which students will grow.
When these students leave the sterilized confines of the classroom, they
may be ill-equipped to handle a world in which most people profess and
exhibit signs of some religious belief or disbelief. In this respect, a
government that respects and allows religious pluralism will best
prepare students for the future.
While legislative policy choices may strive to achieve legitimate
goals, these policies, in effect, have taken their respective states much
further in the direction of uniformity and secularization than neutrality;
however, the globalized world is neither uniform nor profoundly secular.
By specifically targeting religious garb, these states signal hostility
toward religion and preference for secular themes. The continuation of
such policies will adversely affect students' ability to navigate through a
globalized society in their adult lives.

100. Reimers, supranote 84.

